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STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3) (j), (Supp. 1992) 1 
Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is vested in the Supreme 
Court of the. State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§78-2-2(3)(j) (Suppr 1992), which states: 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
court of record, which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court error by permitting the 
plaintiff to proceed on different claims, when such claims 
were first presented to the court at the time of trial when no 
prior request to amend the pleadings had been made by 
plaintiff and defendant/appellant objected to such amendment 
at such late date. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW Where the lower court is given broad 
discretion to permit leave to amend pleadings, the Appellate 
Court does not disturb such ruling unless the appellant 
establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to 
appellant. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P2d 817 (Utah App., 
1988). 
2. Did the District Court error in making an equitable 
determination that a constructive trust exists and that the 
existence of such constructive trust was established by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW Where the District Court is making an 
1 
equitable determination, it is the duty of the Supreme Court 
on appeal of an equity case to weigh the facts as well as to 
review the law. Jensen v. Brown, 639 P2d 150 (Utah, 1981) 
Reed v. Alvey 619 P2d 1374 (Utah, 1980); Matter of Hock's 
Estate, 655 P2d 1111 (Utah, 1982); Adams v. Gubler, 731 P2d 
494 (Utah, 1986). 
It is further the duty and prerogative of the Supreme 
Court to review both the law and the facts and to consider the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence where the proceeding to 
be reviewed is in equity and is an attempt to establish an 
interest in land where legal title is vested in another. 
Richens v. Struhs, 412 P2d 314 (Utah, 1966). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules 
which are applicable and determinative of the issues presented 
in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff/appellee herein commenced a quiet title 
action on or about August 1, 1986, alleging a fraudulent deed 
and/or invalid delivery. (R. 1-5) 
Subsequent to the death of the plaintiff/appellee, Larry 
Wintle, was substituted as plaintiff in the above entitled 
matter by order of the court, dated April 21, 1988. (R. 21) 
The matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
David E. Roth on the 18th day of March, 1991, at which time 
the plaintiff/appellee herein presented its case, under an 
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amended claim (TR. 3-5) despite objection by 
defendant/appellant (TR. 5-6). 
The court declared that it was not going to decide this 
case without seeing the deposition of the decedent, Juanita 
Wintle (TR. 54) and at the conclusion of the case reserved 
ruling on motions pending submission of the deposition (TR. 
97-99). 
After receiving the unsigned original deposition of 
Juanita Wintle, the court issued a Memorandum Decision dated 
February 13, 1992, finding a constructive trust was created 
and each of Juanita Wintle's four (4) children were entitled 
to an equal share of this parcel of real property. (R. 91-
93) 
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant was entered by the court on or about March 31, 1992, 
(R. 111-112) from which the defendant filed the instant 
appeal on the 29th day of April, 1992. (R. 114) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Juanita Wintle, filed a Quit Claim Deed 
with the Weber County Recorder's Office on July 9, 1979, 
wherein Juanita Wintle, did quit claim to Juanita Wintle and 
Georgia Carbajal as joints tenants with full rights of 
survivorship, certain real property located in Weber County, 
State of Utah. (R. 75) 
This action was commenced by non-verified Complaint on 
August 1, 1986, alleging same to be a quiet title action based 
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upon a fraudulent deed or delivery. (R. 1-5) 
Additionally, a Lis Pendens was signed, filed and 
recorded on November 3, 1986, by plaintiff's attorney, Douglas 
M. Durbano. (R. 70) 
After the defendant/appellant herein, filed an Answer to 
plaintiff's Complaint on September 15, 1986, (R. 8) the 
plaintiff's own deposition was scheduled through her attorney 
(R. 10) for the 16th day of October, 1986. (Dep. 1) 
Other than the substitution of Larry Wintle and Brent 
Wintle as personal representative, no discovery was undertaken 
by either party, which is evidenced by the lack of any 
documentation in the file showing any discovery being 
undertaken. 
Plaintiff filed a witness and exhibit list and Notice of 
Use of Loss of Deposition on or about March 4, 1991. (R 66-
67) which indicated the plaintiff intends to have the 
deposition retyped, published and used at trial on March 18, 
1991 pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 64) 
The above entitled matter did come on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the above 
entitled court, sitting without a jury on March 18, 1991, and 
in plaintiff's opening statement counsel indicated the 
plaintiff would be presenting evidence to show a purchase 
money resulting trust or a constructive trust. (TR. 4) 
Upon plaintiff presenting its opening statement and its 
intent to produce evidence on amended claims, defendant 
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objected to the plaintiff proceeding upon such claims, five 
(5) years after the lawsuit was instituted when such claims 
had not been presented previously and defendant indicated 
witnesses had been brought from the State of New Mexico on the 
basis of plaintiff's Complaint. (TR. 5-6) 
Plaintiff's counsel indicated it could proceed by virtue 
of The Matter of the Estate of Hock, 65 P2d 1111, and the 
court indicated that it would reserve ruling on the objection 
since it did not have the Hock's case referred to by 
plaintiff's counsel, (TR. 7) when in fact the Hock's case 
does not discuss amendment of pleadings. 
Brent Wintle, the substituted Personal Representative and 
one of the four heirs of Juanita Wintle's estate testified to 
a conversation between himself, Brent Wintle and his deceased 
mother, Juanita Wintle, as follows: 
She told me she was intending on doing that 
and that Georgia would, at the time of her death, 
divide the house up amongst all four of us, but she 
wanted to provide Georgia with a place to live, 
because she was divorced and had no place to stay. 
(TR. 13) 
The defendant objected to such testimony pursuant to Rule 
601(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence related to 
trustworthiness and corroboration to which the court indicated 
it would allow such statements and the weight to be given such 
statements could be argued. (TR. 14-15) 
Brent Wintle further testified after six or eight months, 
Georgia moved to an apartment in South Ogden and he did not 
discuss any joint tenancy arrangement with his mother again, 
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until 1986, when Juanita Wintle wanted to sell such property. 
(TR. 17) 
Brent Wintle further testified that he did not know the 
Quit Claim Deed had been prepared and recorded until 1986. 
(TR. 24) 
While Larry Wintle a son and heir to Juanita Wintle's 
Estate was testifying and was asked a question relating to the 
deposition of Juanita Wintle taken in October, 1986, the court 
after defendant objected to Larry Wintle testifying to what 
Juanita Wintle said in her deposition, declared: 
The court: "Why don't I tell you right now I 
am not going to decide this case, without seeing 
that deposition." 
Mr. Carmichael: "I can get ..." 
The court: "Finish the evidence. I am going 
to see the deposition before I make a decision." 
The plaintiff also called Georgia Carbajal Ferguson as a 
witness who testified she felt it was in her mother's best 
interest to keep the house in case of medical problems and 
that older people are better off in their own homes unless 
they cannot be there any longer. (TR. 60) 
Georgia Ferguson, appellant herein, also testified 
Juanita Wintle told her she brought this lawsuit because of 
her sons, and that she really wanted Georgia Ferguson to have 
the house. (TR. 61) 
Georgia Ferguson also testified her mother, Juanita 
Wintle, indicated subsequent to requesting the property back, 
she didn't want it back any more. (TR. 64) 
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Georgia Ferguson testified she was married on May 30, 
1979 in Covingtonf Kentucky to Truman Ferguson and she 
remained with him in Carlisle, Ohio until November, 1979 when 
they moved back to the State of Utah. (TR. 62-63) 
Defendant's marriage certificate was brought to court and was 
stipulated to as May 30, 1979 by plaintiff so that it would 
not be necessary for her to surrender the actual certificate. 
(TR. 63) 
The defendant further testified on July 9, 1979, 
approximately six (6) weeks after her marriage, which is the 
date that the Quit Claim Deed was recorded, she was residing 
in Carlisle, Ohio with her husband, Truman Ferguson and had 
nothing to do with the recording of the Quit Claim Deed. (TR. 
64) 
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff 
indicated Juanita Wintle's deposition would be available 
within two months (TR. 70) and the defendant-appellant 
herein, motioned the court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint 
because the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint 
had not been established, and secondly, upon the basis that 
the plaintiff had not met its burden of clear and convincing 
evidence to establish either type of trust referred to in 
plaintiff's opening argument. (TR. 71-72) 
The court thereupon indicated it would take defendant's 
motion to dismiss under advisement by virtue of the 
"haphazard" way this case has finally ended up in court. (TR 
7 
72) Defendant expressed concern with respect to how the 
deposition testimony which was not presented at the time of 
trial would effect defendant in presenting her case. (TR. 
72-73) 
Sheila Willie was called as a witness by defendant and 
testified as follows: 
Q: When you say she told you about her kids 
and her grandkids, what did she say? 
A: Well, at one time when we were talking, she 
told me that she did not want any of her other kids 
having anything because none of them cared anything 
about her, except for Georgia. And she was the 
only one that ever did anything for her. She was 
the only one there when she needed her. 
Q: Okay, now when she was making this 
statement there in the hospital, was she... in your 
opinion, was she able to understand what she was 
saying? 
A: Yes, she knew what she was saying. She was 
coherent. She knew. (TR - 76) 
Ginger Millikan testified to a conversation in Easter of 
1978, when Juanita Wintle had told her she wanted everything 
to go to Georgia and her kids, (TR. 80) 
Larue Loock testified Juanita Wintle had told her she had 
signed the property over to Georgia and that she wasn't going 
to tell anybody about having done so. (TR 82-83) 
Georgia Ferguson then testified Juanita Wintle, with whom 
she spoke to daily during her lifetime including when the 
lawsuit was proceeding, told her before her deposition of 
October, 1986, what she (Juanita Wintle) was going to say: 
A: She said she was going to say that she put 
it my name so the house did not go through probate 
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or something like that. I think that's what 
Larry... you know, I don't know anything about 
probate myself so I am naive on it. She was going 
to say she didn't know Ginger and Austin and Willy 
Taylor. That she had only met them once. And 
where she had spent a lot of time at their homes. 
I said mother that is perjury, and you can't do 
that. She said I have to because Larry is going to 
be with me at the deposition and I don't want him 
to be mad at me. (TR 90-91) 
Defendant further testified Juanita Wintle after the 
deposition stated that she would never sign the deposition 
because she did lie on it. (TR. 91) 
During the trial, the Last Will and Testament of Juanita 
Wintle was admitted as evidence without objection. (R 76-82) 
Juanita Wintle provided in her Will: 
"The personal representative of my estate 
shall be reimbursed from my estate for any and all 
legal and related expenses incurred in legal action 
filed on my behalf entitled "Wintle v. Ferguson", 
filed in the Weber District Court, Civil Number: 
96935." 
The Will also provided as follows: 
1. INCLUDED PROPERTY. It is my intent that 
all of the assets of which I may be possessed at my 
death, including all items of real, personal and 
mixed property, including all insurance policies 
which should be located with this Will, shall be 
included in the estate contemplated by this, my 
Last Will and Testament. (R 77-78) 
Such Will was signed on December 17, 1986, and was 
witnessed by Douglas M. Durbano, who was also her attorney in 
this proceeding at that time. Such Will was signed 
approximately one and one half months after the original 
deposition was prepared for signature by Juanita Wintle and 
such deposition was never signed by Juanita Wintle (Dep. 35) 
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and no explanation other than the explanation advanced by 
defendant that she would not sign the Will has ever been 
presented. 
Plaintiff/appellee's attorney submitted the original 
deposition of Juanita Wintle on or about December 11, 1991, 
approximately nine (9) months after the trial of March 18, 
1991 (R. 104) and the court issued its Memorandum Decision, 
dated February 13, 1992. (R. 91-93) 
With respect to the unsigned deposition of Juanita 
Wintle, (which was conducted on October 16, 1986) and which 
was noticed for hearing through her attorney, (Dep« 4) 
Juanita Wintle testified Georgia Ferguson lived with her for 
approximately six (6) months and that she was living with her 
at the time she signed the Quit Claim Deed, (Dep. 7) which is 
contrary to the evidence because of defendant's marriage in 
Kentucky. 
Juanita Wintle also testified in her deposition she 
remembered going down to the Weber City and County Building 
and signing the Quit Claim Deed. (Dep. 10) 
Juanita Wintle also testified Georgia Ferguson did not 
exert any pressure on her to prepare or record the Quit Claim 
Deed. (Dep. 16) 
Juanita Wintle also stated she had told "the lady" at the 
City and County Building that she wanted Georgia's name on the 
deed with her and the Deed was prepared there in the City and 
County Building that same day by the lady that was in charge 
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at the Weber County Recorder's Office. (Dep. 17-18) 
After such document was prepared, she indicated she 
signed it and had it recorded. 
Juanita Wintle testified additionally as follows: 
Q: (Mr. Perkins) You knew at the time, didn't 
you Mrs. Wintle, that when you put Georgia's name 
on it, that when you died, it went to Georgia? 
A: No I didn't. 
Q: Now. • 
A: I knew it would go to Georgia, but she was 
supposed to, like a said, supposed to have sold it 
and divided it equally. (Dep. 25-26) 
Juanita Wintle was further asked the following questions 
and gave the following responses: 
Q: That's not my question, though Ma'am. My 
question is, if you would like me to repeat it, is 
that you knew that you were signing a document that 
put the property in your name and Georgia's name, 
didn't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you knew that it was being recorded 
that day, because you signed it right there at the 
county building, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And it is just that now. •. and at that 
time you trusted Georgia? 
Ai That's right? 
Q: And now you don't trust Georgia? 
A: That's right. 
Q: But at the time you signed it and when 
you signed it in 1979, at that time, you knew that 
you were conveying it in Georgia's name? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: And she didn't lie to you about anything 
regarding you signing it, did she? 
A: No. (Dep. 31-32) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Georgia Ferguson asserts the lower court 
committed error in allowing the plaintiff to proceed on 
amended claims of action first presented at the time of trial. 
Defendant asserts the trial court's decision to take 
under advisement defendant's objection to proceeding on 
amended claims and then rendering its decision after receiving 
the deposition of Juanita Wintle some nine (9) months later 
without considering the effect of allowing such different 
claim constituted an abuse of discretion and unfairly 
prejudiced the defendant. 
Defendant asserts the plaintiff, personal representative 
of Juanita Wintle's estate, did not establish by clear and 
convincing evidence the existence of a constructive trust. The 
personal representative failed to establish the existence of 
a confidential relationship nor the existence of undue 
influence, fraud or inequitable conduct by the defendant 
herein which would justify reformation of the deed. 
Additionally, the District Court made no finding of such 
confidential relationship but based its decision upon the 
unsigned deposition of Juanita Wintle who expressed an intent 
to avoid probate by conveying the property to herself and the 
defendant. Allowing the grantor, Juanita Wintle, through her 
personal representative to attack and impeach her own deed in 
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the absence of fraud, duress, mistake or other proper conduct 
attributable to the defendant, Georgia Ferguson constitutes 
further error by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED UPON A NEW CAUSE OF 
ACTION RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT TRIAL 
The Utah Supreme Court in Girard v. Appleby. 660 P2d 245 
(Utah, 1983) held where plaintiff on the morning of trial, 
motioned to amend the Complaint comprising new and different 
causes of action as follows: 
Rule 15(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
permits the amendment of pleadings by leave of 
court, and the Rule is to be liberally construed so 
as to further the interest of justice. However, 
the Rule is to be applied with less liberality when 
the amendments are proposed during or after the 
trial rather than before trial. 
In Girard v. Appleby, cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the lower court's refusal to allow such amendment where 
such changes were a significant change in the cause of action, 
were not consented to by the defendant, and no reason was 
adduced for not timely moving to amend his claim prior to 
trial. Girard's inability to state an adequate reason for the 
untimeliness of the motion did not present a case where 
"justice requires an amendment". 
In Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way, 753 P2d 507 (Utah 
App., 1988), the Court of Appeals held the second part of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(b) is permissive and must be 
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looked at to both afford the privilege of presenting 
legitimate contentions pertaining to the dispute balanced with 
the adverse side having reasonable notice of the issues raised 
and an opportunity to meet them. 
Similarly, in Kelly v. Utah Power and Light, 746 P2d 1189 
(Utah Ap'p. 1987) , the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court, which had denied plaintiff's request to amend his 
complaint one week prior to trial where it had been pending 
over three years and such request to amend within one week of 
scheduled trial could have required a continuance which could 
have prejudice consolidation in cases, specifically declaring: 
In considering a motion to amend, the trial 
judge must decide whether the opposing side would 
be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare. 
Bekins Bar V. Ranch v. Huth, 664 P2d 455, 464 
(Utah, 1983). 
In Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P2d 817 (Utah App., 1988) the 
Court of Appeals held it could not say the trial court had 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend 
her complaint on the morning of trial, declaring: 
Generally, relief to amend is liberally 
allowed in the interest of justice, but justice is 
often uninterested in amendments alleging new and 
different causes of action on the eve of trial. 
See Staker, 664 P2d at 1190; Girard, 660 P2d at 
248; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a). The 
amendment of pleadings on the eve of trial causes 
great disruption to the legal process and is unfair 
to an opponent who has conducted discovery, fully 
prepared the case and scheduled trial time based on 
the moving party's prior pleadings. 
Nonetheless, there are certainly occasions 
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where justice excuses untimeliness. A motion to 
amend raised shortly before or at trial, in 
response to facts discovered subsequent to the 
prior pleading, should be allowed if there is a 
reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering 
the facts and the amendment is not unduly 
prejudicial to the opposing party. 
In the instant proceeding, the plaintiff commenced her 
lawsuit in August, 1986, and trial was not conducted until 
March 18, 1991, and the decedent's unsigned deposition was not 
presented until December 11, 1991 and plaintiff had made no 
motion to amend its pleadings until the morning of trial when 
plaintiffs counsel suggested its evidence would show the 
existence of a constructive and/or purchase money resulting 
trust to the court. (TR 3-5) 
Defendant-appellant asserts the defacto permitting of 
such amendment of plaintiff's pleading by the lower court 
without having made findings upon defendant-appellant's 
objection to such amendment being made at trial constitutes an 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge who failed to consider 
"whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable 
prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not 
time to prepare" as stated in Kelly v. Utah Power and Light, 
746 P2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987). 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT A 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WAS CREATED BY JUANITA WINTLE 
Juanita Wintle, the decedent herein, in her unsigned 
deposition dated October 16, 1986, gave testimony she knew she 
was signing a document that placed the property in her name 
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and in the name of Georgia Carbajal, the defendant herein and 
that she could not recall any misrepresentations being made by 
the defendant herein. (Dep. 31-34) 
The defendant herein presented her marriage certificate 
which indicated she was married on May 30, 1979 in Covington, 
Kentucky and she and her husband, Truman Ferguson, remained in 
Carlisle, Ohio, from that time until she returned to the State 
of Utah November, 1979 at Thanksgiving and was not in the 
State of Utah when her mother, Juanita Wintle signed and 
recorded the Quit Claim Deed on July 9, 1979. (TR. 64-65) 
In Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d 1177 (Utah App., 1988), 
the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to 
prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of any 
express or implied intention to form a trust. In 
the Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P2d 1111, 
(Utah, 1982). If the challenging party establishes 
a constructive trust by clear and convincing 
evidence, the trial court may alter a deed regular 
in form and presumed to convey clear title. Ashton 
v. Ashton, 733 P2d 147 (Utah, 1987). A 
constructive trust may be imposed if the grantee 
was in a confidential relationship with the 
grantor. 
The Court of Appeals in considering what constitutes a 
confidential relationship in the legal sense in Mattes v. 
Olearain, cited for authority Webster v. Lehmer, 742 P2d 1203, 
1206, wherein the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The doctrine of confidential relationship 
rests upon the principle of inequality between the 
parties, and applies a position of superiority 
occupied by one of the parties over the other. 
In Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P2d 1024 (Utah, 1987) Justice 
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Zimmerman in a concurring opinion wrote: 
"The burden of proof is upon the one asserting 
a constructive trust to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that equitable ground for 
imposing a trust exists..." (citations omitted) 
This burden cannot be met by simply showing that 
there was a transaction between the parties 
apparently for the benefit of one and that they had 
a close family relationship. 
In order to impose a constructive trust, in 
addition to the family relationship, there must be 
shown: [the grantor's] age and infirmity on one 
hand, actual dominance on the part of the grantee, 
an established course of management of the 
grantor's affairs by the grantee, or other similar 
facts making it inequitable to make the grantee to 
prevail. Matter of the Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz, 
480, 482, 671 P2d 921, 923 (Ariz. Cr. App. 1983). 
In VonHake v. Thomas, 704 P2d 766 (Utah, 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court declared the law does not lightly recognize the 
existence of a confidential relationship and the law presumes 
one would ordinarily make his own judgments however imperfect 
and act on them. 
Similarly in Webster v. Lehman, 742 P2d 1203, (Utah, 
1987) Justice Durham in a concurring opinion wrote: 
"Given the drastic consequences a finding of 
the confidential relationship has for the parties 
to a contract, we should be very careful in 
defining the circumstances under which such a 
relationship can be found to exist•" 
Defendant-appellant asserts and testified that Juanita 
Wintle told her she would not sign the deposition because she 
had lied in parts of it. (TR. 96) 
Inasmuch as this lawsuit was commenced in 1986 (non 
verified Complaint); whereas Juanita Wintle's deposition was 
17 
taken on October 16, 1986 with . Larry Wintle also being 
present; whereas, the shorthand reporter subscribed her name 
(Joanne Pratt) on the 30th day of October, 1986 to such 
deposition and; whereas a Lis Pendens was filed by Attorney 
Douglas Durbano on November 3, 1986; and whereas Juanita 
Wintle signed her Will dated December 17, 1986 the Appellant 
asserts all such factors lead to the result' that a 
constructive trust was not formed in the instant proceeding. 
Appellant asserts the sua sponte action by the Court 
declaring it would read at a later date the deposition of 
Juanita Wintle not knowing if it had been signed or the 
circumstances surrounding the deposition not being signed, did 
so without considering the factors enumerated in the preceding 
paragraph and led to the lower court's erroneous result. 
Appellant further asserts plaintiff who is in reality the 
heirs of Juanita Wintle's estate did not establish by clear 
and convincing evidence a constructive trust was created and 
suggests the lack of further action by Juanita Wintle while 
she was alive, supports the conclusion a constructive trust 
should not be applied. 
Juanita Wintle had not divested herself from real 
property in North Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, but had, 
by Quit Claim Deed, made herself a joint tenant with rights of 
survivorship with her daughter, Georgia Carbajal Ferguson. (R. 
75) Juanita Wintle as a joint tenant could have severed the 
joint tenancy by voluntary conveyance to a third party as 
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provided in Tracv-Collins Trust Company v, Goeltz, 301 P2d 
1086 (Utah, 1956) and defendant asserts that this lack of 
action by the plaintiff during her lifetime, negates the claim 
for a constructive trust. 
Similarly, the Last Will and Testament of Juanita Wintle, 
dated December 17, 1986, provided as follows: 
The personal representative of my estate shall 
be reimbursed from my estate for any and all legal 
and related expenses incurred in the legal action 
filed on my behalf entitled Wintle v. Ferguson, 
filed in the Weber District Court, Civil Number 
96935. (R 77) 
Juanita Wintle's Will also provided: 
"1. Included Property. It is my intent that 
all of the assets of which I may be possessed at my 
death, including all items of real, personal and 
mixed property, including all insurance policies, 
which should be located with this will shall be 
included int he estate contemplated by this, my 
Last Will and Testament. (R 78) 
Defendant asserts such Last Will of Juanita Wintle signed 
over four (4) months after this lawsuit was instituted and six 
(6) weeks after her deposition was prepared for her signature 
which was never signed by her does not indicate an intent to 
change the status of the Quit Claim Deed conveying the real 
property located in North Ogden, Utah to Georgia Carbajal 
Ferguson, defendant-appellant herein. 
In the instant proceeding, the evidence showed Juanita 
Wintle7s health problems developed subsequent to her signing 
and recording the Quit Claim Deed conveying the real property 
to herself t*nd the defendant as joint tenants with right of 
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survivorship. The evidence also shows a lack of any dominance 
being imposed upon Juanita Wintle by the defendant herein for 
the defendant was residing in the State of Ohio when the deed 
was recorded and had been so residing for approximately a 
month and a half prior to Juanita Wintle going to the 
Recorder's office and recording the Quit Claim Deed. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Nielsen v. Rasmussen, 558 P2d 
511, (Utah, 1976) provided the existence of a constructive 
trust upon property must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence and such burden of proof must be shown to exist at 
the time of the transfer and that a confidential relationship 
existed at the time of transfer. 
Defendant-appellant asserts there can be no finding of a 
confidential relationship existing in July, 1979, when Georgia 
Ferguson was residing in Ohio and Juanita Wintle recorded the 
deed on her own volition which is necessary to impose a 
constructive trust in this case. 
In Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P2d 
398 (Utah, 1986) the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake or the like 
attributable to grantee, competent grantor will not 
be permitted to attack or impeach his own deed." 
Desert Centers Inc., v. Olen Canyon, Inc., 11 Utah 
2d 166, 356 P2d 286 (1960). As between the parties 
a deed is good, with or without consideration. 
Brown v. Peterson Development Co., Utah, 622 P2d 
1175 (1980)." 
In the instant proceeding, there is no evidence the 
grantee committed any of those acts enumerated in Barlow 
Society, cited supra, necessary for a grantor to attack her 
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own deed. Further, as between partiesf such deed is good with 
or without consideration. 
Consistent with Barlow Society v. Commercial Security 
Bank, cited supra Bown v. Loveland, 678 P2d 292 (Utah, 1984) 
held, for reformation of a deed the moving party must show 
either a mutual mistake by the parties or a mistake by one and 
fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party. Neither of 
these elements exist in this case and reformation of the deed 
should not be permitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing arguments, the 
defendant, Georgia Carbajal Ferguson, requests that this court 
reverse the District Court granting judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and requests this court determine and declare 
defendant-appellant to be the owner of the real property 
forming the subject matter of this law suit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this S ^ day of Auartt, 1992. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four (4) true and exact 
copies of the foregoing appellant's brief to Larrie Carmichael 
at: 65 North 3700 West, #313, Hurricane, Utah 84737 on this 
day of August, 1992. tT 
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IN THE SKCOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATK OK UTAH 
JUANITA WINTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGIA FERGUSON, a/k/a 
GEORGIA CARBAJAL, 
Defendant. 
LIS PENDENS 
Civi 1 I HU^f 
TO THE WEBf-R COUNTY RICORDKR: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY givm that an action has been corrunenccd 
and is now ponding in the ahovo-ont\ 11 CM! Court on the Complaint 
of the above-named Plaintiff, JUANITA WINTLK, against the 
above-named Defendant, GEORGIA FERGUSON, a/k/a GEORGIA CAPBAJAL, 
for a Quiet Title action, etc., in regards to the real property 
described as follows: 
All of 1x51 19, Block r, LOMOND ACRES 
SUBDIVISION, North Ogden City, Wfber 
(onnty, Utah. 
Property Address: 478 East 3050 North 
North Ogden, UT. 84404 
DATED this \ ) day of August, 1986, 
\ ' . ^ -DOUGLAS M. DURBANO 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
'ATE Of UTAH | 
BOUNTY OF WEB£R J * 
RcCORD IN MY OFFICE AppEARS OF 
WITNESS Mr HAND AND SEAL 
T H I S / * - DAY OF f r i - t - c ^ <? , 
JOUGCRCFTSweWV-Nm£ • " • < ' 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Case No. gg/yy j l l ^ V 
Date: 3 - / ^ ? / 
Clerk's Initials W - / 
OF 
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
I, Alice Juanita Wintle, residing at 478 East 3050 North, 
City of North Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, at the age of 
74 years old, having been born on February 24, 1912, being of 
sound and disposing mind, and not acting under any undue influ-
ence or persuasion from any person, do hereby make and declare 
this my Last Will and Testament. 
ARTICLE I 
Preliminary Provisions 
1. PRIOR WILLS. I hereby revoke any and all wills and 
codicils heretofore made by me. I hereby declare that this will 
shall not be revoked, amended or modified by another will or 
codicil in whatever form made unless such instrument is dated 
subsequent to the date of this will. 
2. FAMILY STATUS. I declare that I am a widow and not 
married and that I have four (4) children, ("my children") whose 
names, date of births, and addresses are as follows: 
Name & Date of Birth Location 
George Larry Wintle (11/28/38) Ogden, Utah 
Gloria Lee Crouch (11/28/38) Perry, Utah 
Brent Albert Wintle (04/04/40) Ogden, Utah 
Georgia May Ferguson (05/24/43) Ogden, Utah 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
3. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE/GURARDIAN. I hereby nominate and 
appoint my son, George Larry Wintle, to serve without bond as 
Personal Representative hereof. In the event George Larry Wintle 
shall, for any reason, be unable to so serve, I nominate and 
appoint my son, Brent Albert Wintle, as Personal Representative 
to serve without bond in the probate of my Last Will and 
Testament. The Personal Representative of my estate shall be 
reimbursed from my estate for any and all legal and related 
expenses incurred in the legal action filed on my behalf entitled 
Wintle vs. Ferguson, filed in the Weber County District Court, 
Civil #96935. 
4. PAYMENT OF DEBTS, TAXES AND FUNERAL EXPENSES. I direct 
my Personal Representative to pay, as soon after my death as is 
convenient, my expenses of my last illness, funeral expenses, 
just debts, and any estate, inheritance, or other succession tax 
payable by reason of my death, whether or not attributable to 
property subject to this Will. My instructions for interment, 
which should be followed, are attached to or located with this 
Will. 
5. DEFINITIONS. Whenever it shall be necessary to inter-
pret this instrument, the masculine shall include the feminine 
and the singular the plural, unless the context indicates a 
different intent. The terms "children" or "descendants" is 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
intended to identify those children specifically named above, 
also children conceived but not yet born, provided they are 
hereafter born living, but does include adopted children. 
The term "spouse" refers to my present spouse, as named above. 
If I am not married to the above named spouse at the time of my 
death, this Will shall be void and of no effect. 
ARTICLE II 
Dispositive Provisions 
1. INCLUDED PROPERTY. It is my intent that all of the 
assets of which I may be possessed at my death, including all 
items of real, personal and mixed property, including all 
insurance policies which should be located with this Will, 
shall be included in the estate contemplated by this, my Last 
Will and Testament. 
2. SEPARATE WRITING GIFTS. I give and bequeath all of my 
personal effects, including my wardrobe, jewelry, guns, sporting 
equipment and similar belongings, and my household effects all of 
which is personal property, other than money or securities, in 
accordance with such written statement ot list as I may have 
prepared and signed prior to my death, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, 75-2-513, which writing is in my own handwriting, 
describing the property and to whom such is given and which is 
signed by me and kept with this Will or elsewhere among my 
28 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
personal effects. In the event that I have not prepared a 
writing pursuant to this paragraph or to the extent that I have 
not disposed of my household and personal property pursuant to as 
separate writing, I direct that such household and personal 
property shall pass pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article. 
3. CONTINGENT GIFT/RESIDUE. All property included in this 
Will not otherwise disposed of shall be distributed in kind or as 
cash from the sale of such property, if my Personal Represen-
tative should determine that it would be in the best interest of 
the children to sell such property, as follows: 
I give and bequeath to my children, to be divided equally 
among and between them, per stirpes, all my remaining personal 
and household effects, any automobile or automobiles, all real 
property, and all other assets or interests which are property 
included in this Will. Such property shall be divided equally 
among them as they may agree. If they cannot agree among 
themselves as to the division and disposition of such property my 
Personal Representative shall divide such property into articles 
or groups of articles and such persons shall then draw lots to 
determine the order in which each shall select an article or 
group of acticles. After each has made a selection in the order 
as determined by lot, the order of choice shall be reversed and 
this system shall continue until all said property has been 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
selected. The division of such property into articles or groups 
of articles made by my Personal Representative shall be binding 
and conclusive with respect to all persons interested in my 
estate. 
4. PRETERMITTED HEIRS. I have in mind all persons who are 
natural objects of my bounty. Except as expressly provided for 
in this Will, I have intentionally omitted to provide in my Will 
for any person claiming to be an heir of mine. 
5. NON-CONTEST PROVISION. If any person, be he or she an 
heir, devisee, or legatee under this Will, or their successors in 
interest, or any other person who, if I died intestate, would or 
may be entitled to any part of my Estate, shall either directly 
or indirectly, singly or in conjunction with other persons, seek 
to set aside this Will, or attack, oppose, or seek to set aside 
the probate of this Will, or to impair, invalidate, or set aside 
its provisions, or shall consent to, acquiesce in, or fail to 
contest such proceedings, then in any or all of the above-
mentioned instances and events, I hereby give and bequeath to 
such person or persons, the sum of $1.00 and no more, in lieu of 
any other share or interest in my Estate. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Alice Juanita W. Wintle, the 
testatrix, sign my name to this, my Last Will and Testament which 
consisting of /^  type written pages, each bearing my initials, 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
on this / /jJL day of >O^Cfewi.\o£v^- '_, 19 % ? , and being 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned indivi-
duals that I sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and 
Testament and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it as my 
free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and that 
I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and 
under no constraint or undue influence. 
^^ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE 
, the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the 
undersigned authority that the testatrix signs and executes this 
instrument as her Last Will and that she signs it willingly, and 
that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testatrix and 
of each other, hereby signs this Will as witness to the 
testatrix±s signing, and that to the best of our knowledge the 
testatrix is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, 
and \nder no constraint or undue influej 
WITNE 
*fQffr^T7& <>. UAYU l/Jha&». /y^Jy 
RESIDENCE ^ RESIDENCE ' 
&*j 
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OF 
ALICF JUANITA W. WINTLE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
& 
SuJ>sf:ribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by 
'-nfL- ft * //jUy^^u^l the Testatrix, and subscribed and 
ma 
sworn ^ o ^ b e f o r e ^ ^ by 
and \ i m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
day 
W/jL&Q ^.^/MJArrtf 
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, w i t n e s s e s , th 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUANITA WINTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGIA FERGUSON 
Defendant. 
The trial in this case case conducted on March 18, 1991. 
At the conclusion of the testimony I determined that I could not 
properly decide the case without reading the deposition of 
Juanita Wintle who was deceased. The deposition was provided to 
me in December 1991, and a scheduling conference was conducted 
on January 10, 1992, to determine if either attorney wanted to 
have a hearing to present final arguments. On January 16, 1992, 
defendant's attorney advised me by letter that he did not see a 
need for oral argument. A copy of that letter was sent to 
plaintiff's attorney. I have heard nothing from either attorney 
since then and assume the case is submitted to me for decision. 
Having reviewed the evidence produced a the trial and 
having read the deposition of Juanita Wintle, I find and rule as 
follows: 
t DECISION 
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I find that the following facts have been proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
Juanita Wintle's husband died in 1976, leaving her in 
sole possession of the home and property in question. Ms. 
Wintle owned no other property of significant value. Ms. Wintle 
had four adult children. 
In 1979, Ms. Wintle deeded her home to herself and her 
daughter Georgia Ferguson as joint tenants. Ms. Ferguson did 
not pay her mother anything as consideration for this 
transaction. 
I find that it was Ms. Wintle's intention, in making this 
transaction to avoid probate. It was also her intention and 
belief that upon her death, the property would be divided 
equally among her children. 
In 1986, Ms. Wintle wanted to sell her home so she could 
move to a place that would require less maintenance. Ms. 
Ferguson would not allow her mother to sell the house and Ms. 
Wintle then initiated this action. 
Ms. Wintle executed a will on December 17, 1986, 
directing that all her property be divided equally among her 
children. The will names her son George Wintle, as personal 
representative. 
Juanita Wintle died on June 3, 1987, and her son took 
over the prosecution of this case on behalf of her estate. 
Decision 
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Georgia Ferguson remains in sole possession of the 
property in question. Ms. Wintle's estate does not consist of 
any other property of any significance. 
Based upon the above findings, it is my opinion that Ms. 
Ferguson will be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the 
property. I find that a constructive trust was created when Ms. 
Wintle transferred the property to herself and her daughter and 
that the intended result was that upon Ms. Wintle's death that 
all her children would share equally in the property. 
I therefore find that each of Juanita Wintle's children 
is entitled to an equal share of the property in question. 
Plaintiff is directed to prepare documents consistent 
with this decision for my signature. 
DATED this ' day of February, 1992. 
Decision 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the N ^ day of February, 
1992, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision 
to counsel as follows: 
Larrie A. Carmichael 
65 North 3700 West #313 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
Ronald W. Perkins 
205 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
/ 
uty Court Clerk 
LARRIE A CARMICHAEL (0580) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
65 North 3700 West #313 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
Telephone (801)635-0815 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUANTTA WINTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGIA FERGUSON, aka 
GEORGIA CARBAJAL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
# 
-b \ 
# H? 
Civil No. 860996935 
(Hon. David E. Roth) 
This action came on for trial on March 18, 1991 (and was submitted for decision on 
January 16, 1992), before the Court sitting without a jury, Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, 
presiding, Larrie A. Carmichael appearing a counsel for the plaintiff, and Ronald W. Perkins 
appearing as counsel for the defendant, and the Court having reviewed the evidence produced at the 
trial and having read the deposition of Juanita Wintle, and the Court having rendered its memorandum 
Decision dated February 13, 1992, and the Court having made and filed its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, now therefore, upon motion of plaintiffs attorney, it is hereby 
1 
j Recorded BookJLUU } 
Page 82-w- J 
Indexed J 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Prior to June 7, 1979, plaintiff, Juanita Wintle, owned in fee simple a home and real 
property located at 478 East 3050 North, North Ogden, Utah 84404, more particularly described as 
follows: 
All of Lot 19, Block 5, LOMOND ACRES SUBDIVISION, in North 
Ogden City, Weber County, Utah, according to the Official Plat thereof. 
(Serial No. 17-032-0019) 
2. On or about June 7, 1979, Juanita Wintle, executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying 
title to the home to herself and her daughter Georgia Ferguson, also known as Georgia Carbajal, as 
joint tenants, which deed was recorded on June 9, 1979. A construaive trust in favor of Juanita 
pintle was created when Juanita Wintle transferred title to the above described property from herself to 
herself and Georgia Ferguson, also known as Georgia Carbajal, as joint tenants, and upon the death of 
Juanita Wintle on June 3, 1987, title to the above described real property vested in her children 
equally, namely, GEORGE LARRY WINTLE, GLORIA LEE CROUCH, BRENT A WINTLE and 
GEORGIA MAY FERGUSON. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded costs of Court agmnst defendant in the sum of $238.00. 
DATED: March . 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
(No r e s p o n s e as of 3 -23-92) 
Roland W. Perkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
JUDGMENT 2 CIVIL NO. 860996935 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Judgment for approval as to 
form to the following this 9th day of March, 1992. 
Ronald W. Perkins, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
205 26th Street #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL (0580) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
65 North 3700 West #313 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
Telephone (801)635-0815 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUANITA WINTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGIA FERGUSON, aka 
GEORGIA CARBAJAL, 
Defendant. 
This action came on for trial on March 18, 1991 (and was submitted for decision on 
January 16, 1992), before the Court sitting without a jury, Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, 
presiding, Larrie A. Carmichael appearing a counsel for the plaintiff, and Ronald W. Perkins 
appearing as counsel for the defendant, and the Court having reviewed the evidence produced at the 
trial and having read the deposition of Juanita Wintle, and the Court having rendered its memorandum 
Decision dated February 13, 1992, now, upon motion of plaintiff's attorney, makes and files its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 860996935 
(Hon. David E. Roth) 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to June 7, 1979, plaintiff, Juanita Wintle, owned in fee simple a home and real 
property located at 478 East 3050 North, North, Ogden, Utah 84404, more particularly described as 
follows: All of Lot 19, Block 5, LOMOND ACRES SUBDIVISION, in North 
Ogden City, Weber County, Utah, according to the Official Plat thereof. 
(Serial No. 17-032-0019) 
2. On or about June 7, 1979, Juanita Wintle, executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying 
title to the home to herself and her daughter Georgia Ferguson, also known as Georgia Carbajal, as 
joint tenants, which deed was recorded on June 9, 1979. Plaintiff made a Lis Pendens dated August 
1, 1986, in this case describing the above property and which was recorded November 3, 1986, in 
Book 1502, Page 1498, as Entry No. 987744 of Official Records in the Office of the Weber County 
Recorder, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that the following facts have been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
4. Juanita Wintle's husband died in 1976, leaving her in sole possession of the home 
and property in question. Juanita Wintle owned no other property of significant value. Juanita Wintle 
had four adult children, namely, George Larry Wintle, Gloria Lee Crouch, Brent A. Wintle, and 
Georgia May Ferguson the defendant herein. 
5. In 1979, Juanita Wintle deeded her home to herself and her daughter Georgia 
Ferguson as joint tenants. Georgia Ferguson did not pay her mother anything as consideration for this 
transaction. 
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6. The Court finds that it was Juanita Wintle's intention, in making this transaction to 
avoid probate. It was also her intention and belief that upon her death, the property would be divided 
equally among her children. 
7. In 1986, Juanita Wintle wanted to sell her home so she could move to a place that 
would require less maintenance. Defendant would not allow her mother to sell the house and Juanita 
Wintle then initiated this action 
8. Juanita Wintle executed a will on December 17, 1986, directing that all her property 
be divided equally among her children. The will names her son, George Wintle, as personal 
representative. (Her son, Brent A. Wintle, is presently the appointed personal representative.) 
9. Juanita Wintle died on June 3, 1987, and her son took over the prosecution of this 
case on behalf of her estate. (The will has been admitted into probate in the Matter of the Estate of 
Juanita Wintle, deceased, Probate No. 87-3916630 in this Court.) 
10. Defendant Georgia Ferguson remains in sole possession of the property in 
question. Juanita Wintle's estate does not consist of any other property of any significance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based upon the above findings, it is the Court's opinion that defendant, Georgia 
Ferguson, will be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the property. 
2. The Court finds that a constructive trust was created when Juanita Wintle transferred 
the property to herself and her daughter and that the intended result was that upon Juanita Wintle's 
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Wintle's death that all her children would share equally in the property. 
3. The Court therefore finds that each of Juanita Wintle's children is entitled to an 
equal share of the property in question. 
DATED: March j T / > 1 9 9 2-
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT 
E. ROTH 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
(No r e s p o n s e as of 3 - 2 3 - 9 2 ) 
Ronald W. Perkins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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